REPORT OF UNIVERSAL BROTHERHOOD DAY 2007
Nuclear cooperation is not full and excludes enrichment and reprocessing technology, which we need to complete our three-stage nuclear fuel cycle.
India does not get unconditional access of uranium fuel or technology. In particular, all cooperation will be stopped should India test another nuclear weapon. The US President must report annually on India's nuclear program. Such reporting can, and probably will, be used to pressure India on other fronts.
Second, by denying India reprocessing technology, the Act prevents us from advancing very far in our three-stage fuel cycle. However, it is an established fact that our much-vaunted thorium fuel cycle is actually highly inefficient and expensive, and exists simply because we do not have sufficient domestic uranium for a traditional full-scale civilian nuclear program. Therefore, if India could be guaranteed uranium fuel, abandoning the 3-stage cycle would actually make economic sense.
That guarantee, of course, will never come. Access even to this nuclear cooperation is conditional and subject to termination.
That guarantee, of course, will never come. Access even to this nuclear cooperation is conditional and subject to termination.
To understand the real loss for India, consider the following scenario. Following this agreement, India builds 5 new, large reactors with American, Russian, and Japanese help. In 2012 the US asks India, once again, to vote against Iran at the IAEA, threatening to stop uranium supplies under the guise of annual reporting requirements. Considering that the Iran-India gas pipeline is now operational, India must now choose between the fire and the frying pan.
By buying into US nuclear cooperation, India will in the future have to choose between that cooperation and other alliances. When our mutual interests collide, as they must, India will be playing what is known in game theory as a game of chicken. Where India has really lost is in signaling that this nuclear cooperation is sacrosanct, and our other considerations are up for negotiation.
India lost several opportunities to signal the same to the US. In particular, public statements by our government supporting the Henry Hyde Act indicate that we will take whatever the US Congress offers. Instead, a smarter strategy would have been to criticize the Act as insufficient and threaten walking away from the deal. The mere willingness to consider rejecting the deal would be a signal that our acquiescence not be taken for granted. Not now. Not later.
Second, a constrained player is stronger. The original agreement with the USA was favorable to India partly because we had domestic constraints. Similarly, if the Prime Minister had subsequently gone to the US Congress and announced that certain conditionalities in the Hyde Act would be rejected by the Indian people, the US Congress would be faced with removing those terms or subsequent rejection of the deal.
Instead, by repeatedly supporting the Hyde Act in Parliament our government weakened those constraints and in the process, has weakened India's negotiating position.
The Final Analysis Not surprisingly, the Hyde Act both offers and takes away such agreements are always based on quid pro quo. The truth is that the Act offers India substantial present benefits. The associated losses are in the future, and the extent of those losses will depend on India's willingness to take choices that are painful in the short term. Because of those tangible nuclear benefits, and despite several reservations, I remain in favor of the deal.
I cannot, however, support India's bungled negotiation process. On the policy front India is yet to see any benefits, such as recognition as a nuclear weapons state. And missteps in negotiation have already reduced India's ability to extract future benefits. India must take steps to limit those foreign policy losses. And the question to ask really is, when India must decide to support Iran, test a nuclear weapon, or buy gas from Myanmar, will it be able to say to the US, "No, thank you"?
The 123 India-US civil nuclear cooperation pact does not deprive India of its sovereign right to test a nuclear device, but it will make such a choice "costly" and "difficult" for New Delhi.
India retains its sovereign right to test. But the conditions which have now been imposed through the 123 agreement or US laws as they have been enacted will make it costlier for India to test.
We have the right to test and the US has the right to return (of nuclear equipment and fuel sold to India under the agreement).
Which means down the years, say five, ten or fifty years down the line, you are faced with a national security situation which should lead you to test, you are then worried about the economic costs of that decision which will be far greater than it was in the past.
The government will be faced with a dilemma... The costs will be greater. It will be a difficult decision. The government will have to convince the people and give reasons (for conducting the test).
When the deal was announced in July 2005 we said that it will adversely impact on our strategic programme. The text of the 123 agreement doesn't really matter as far as I am concerned. The deal ab initio as outlined in July 18, 2005 joint statement itself was at fault.
The separation plan of March 2, 2006 reinforced that concern. The promise to go in for an early conclusion of the Fissile Material Cut- off Treaty (FMCT) further reinforced that concern.
It's not in India's concern. I wouldn't go for this agreement.
The BJP has demanded a vote on the nuclear deal in parliament before the government proceeds with the next steps required to operationalise the 123 pact.
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